Statement on Adopting the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims working definition of Islamophobia

Dear all,

I would like to outline why I intend to abstain during tonight’s vote on our motion calling for Lewisham Council to adopt APPG on British Muslim’s definition of Islamophobia.

Anti-muslim prejudice is a scourge in our society. I agree with my colleagues that defining what is anti-Muslim prejudice is, and how it manifests itself, is an important endeavour — a definition can provide an important guide in identifying potentially anti-Muslim speech. There is a place for organisations to utilise guides on understanding prejudiced speech. Language that for example that might not meet the threshold of ‘racial and religious hatred’ or ‘hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation’ — i.e. fall under hate speech — but is profoundly offensive, racist, or prejudiced.

Rightly and understandably, it is taboo to be a racist or prejudiced person in today’s society. As such, labelling speech bigoted or prejudiced is an effective way to cast into the realm of the illegitimate. It is on this basis that any formal definition (legal or not) of what constitutes prejudice or racism must be thoroughly scrutinised and questioned, with a clear eye on vagueness, loose language, or unintended and intended consequences for legitimate speech and behaviour. When it comes to definitions, semantics matter.

While some defenders of this definition, such as Robert Sharp, have said labelling prejudice is not an act of legal censorship — this is to miss the wider point. He argues, ‘to label something Islamophobic is only a moral condemnation. It does not in itself demand that the state or anyone else censor those words.’ And this leads to the crux of this issue — tonight will be deciding on the framework in which we morally condemn words and the actions of others — it is a profound judgement, and will have reverberations on what institutions, such as local government, deem morally acceptable.

If we get this wrong — and offer any vague or ill-defined definition. institutionalised legitimacy — we might broaden what society deems morally acceptable beyond what we had well-intentioned. We might fundamentally help close the parameters of legitimate speech, by labelling (or assisting others in labelling) the offensive (to some) as racist/hateful.

In my view, this definition has holes within it, that offer space for certain actors to label blasphemous speech, or legitimate criticism of Islamist ideology, as racism or anti-Muslim bigotry.

I will now outline why I believe this to be the case.

The definition I am being asked to vote on, claims Islamophobia is rooted in racism but fails to explain why it thinks that Muslims are a “race” and offer a new definition of a racial or ethnic group.

The APPG of British Muslim report on their definition claims ‘‘race’ is a fiction created when certain ethnic heritage or cultural practices attach to social advantage or disadvantage’, it is hard to see religious identity as ontologically distinct from ‘race’. Intentional and unintentionally, the definition is tying religious identity to race. This is profoundly concerning for those in the secular movement, for example, as it suggests that to critique a religious identity is akin to slandering a race.

The report frequently blurs the lines between race and religious identity and beliefs. For example, when discussing the impact the definition might have on free speech on religion, the report quotes Dr Nadya Ali and Dr Ben Witham approvingly, who argued that “there is no ‘good faith’ criticism of Islam”.

Central in their (Ali and Witham) argument is the concept of inseparability of race and religion, ‘whereby an attack on the religion cannot be separated from an attack on the race because both concepts are constructs adopted “as a means of categorising colonial subjects”. As such, the recourse to the notion of free speech and a supposed right to criticise Islam results in nothing more than another subtle form of anti-Muslim racism, whereby the criticism humiliates, marginalises, and stigmatises Muslims. One, real-life example of this concerns the issue of ‘grooming gangs’’’

While race might be a ‘fiction’ — ie, a social construct (and a damaging colonial one at that) — it is built on innate immutable characteristics — which makes, in my view, racism so grotesque. Criticism, even offensive criticism, towards a person due to their beliefs or ideas, be them religious or political, should be accepted within the scope of free legitimate speech. Criticism of a person due to their innate ethnic characteristics, rightly in my view, remains in the realm of unpalatable and illegitimate (racist) speech. These distinctions matter.

They also matter to many Muslims. The Muslim Census found that only 21% of Muslims believe this to be their preferred definition of Islamophobia. The massive sticking point ‘is the use of the word “racism” by the APPG’.

The definition also claims,

“Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.”

However, the definition does not outline what constitutes Muslimness and who defines this. As Sara Khan notes, if defined in a narrow way, “Muslimness” leaves behind those Muslims who, because of how they choose to live their lives or practise their religion, don’t have a “Muslimness” that other Muslims find acceptable’. For example, the practice of excommunication (Takfir) and wider sectarianism within Muslim communities is a form of anti-Muslim bigotry, but this is overlooked by the definition.

The vagueness of what constitutes Muslimness, leaves the door open to gatekeeping — where certain sections of the Muslim community can define what is Muslimness and what is not. Specifically, the report closes the door on this debate, approvingly quoting Professor Tariq Modood’s argument that “Islamophobia should be confined to naming the specific process through which Muslims are racialised by non-Muslims, which thus entails categorising sectarian issues under a different terminology’.

Moreover, expressions of Muslimness could easily be viewed as Islamic practices. Legitimate criticism of Islamic practices could be viewed as bigotry, targeting expressions of Muslimness. On deciding whether criticism of Islamic practices is Islamophobic (racist) or legitimate, the report outlines five tests devised by Professor Tariq Modood:

1. Does it stereotype Muslims by assuming they all think the same?

Does the criticism(s) seem to suggest that all or most Muslims have this blameworthy characteristic and that this feature defines Muslims, indeed drowns out any worthy characteristics and ignores contextual factors?

2. Is it about Muslims or a dialogue with Muslims, which they would wish to join in?

Does the mode of criticism consist of generalising about a group in a way that tends to exclude them rather than treat them as conversational partners who share common concerns?

3. Is mutual learning possible?

For example, one may criticise some Muslims for sexual conservatism or puritanism but is one willing to listen to those Muslims who think that contemporary societies like Britain are oversexualised and encourage sexually predatory and undignified behaviour?

4. Is the language civil and contextually appropriate?

Is the behaviour or practice being criticised in an offensive way and seems to make Muslims the target rather than stick to the issue? (A good analogy is here is how reasonable, contextual criticism of Zionism can become a diatribe against Jewish people as such.)

5. Insincere criticism for ulterior motives? Does the person doing the criticism really care about the issue or is using it to attack Muslims (in the way that many use feminism and homosexuality)? If the answer to any of the five tests is a ‘Yes’, then we may be dealing with Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism, according to Modood.

As most can see, this criteria on whether assessing criticism of Islam is racism is slippery. Does an individual really care about feminism or LGBT rights, or are they using these issues to ‘attack Muslims’? It goes without saying that this is a question that would in many cases be extremely difficult to answer — anyone’s inner motivations can be questioned, as the likes of Sarah Champion MP, Peter Tatchell, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, and Amanda Spielman can attest to. One can easily see how these ‘criteria’ may be used to delegitimise criticisms of Islamic practices from a feminist perspective or from an LGBT rights perspective. Likewise, criticising sexual or socially conservative attitudes among sections of the Muslim community may be regarded by them as illegitimate, because the speaker is unwilling to accept their starting premise: for example, that Britain is an oversexualised society that encourages sexually predatory and undignified behaviour. If you reject certain counter-arguments, such as those provided by Professor Madood, you may be accused of failing the test of ‘mutual learning’.

In short, a definition of Muslimness needs to be clearly defined — firstly, to avoid gatekeeping of what constitutes ‘Muslimness’, ensuring groups such as Ahmadiyyah Muslims are protected within the scope of the definition. And secondly, to allow space for criticism of Islamic practices (as this is not inherently racist, nor motivated by racism), and thirdly, to not provide any grey area leaving space for criticism of Islamist political ideology or movements to be labelled as ‘expression of Muslimness.’

On this matter, the report and definition fail to provide any distinction between Islamophobia/racism and legitimate anti-Islamism. Indeed as this examination of the APPG’s report highlights, Islamism is only mentioned once in the report and in a deeply problematic manner. Quoting Bertie Vidgen, a DPhil student at the University of Oxford, the report says, “Anti-Islamism is not the same as anti-Muslimism, but the two are intimately connected and both can be considered constitutive parts of Islamophobia.” This is a clear attempt to delegitimise anti-Islamism by tying it to racist speech. There is nothing in the definition separating the two contexts, therefore, it leaves the door open for Islamism to be defined as ‘Muslimness’ — i.e. criticism of Islamism, Islamist organisations, or Islamist organising tactics, as racism.

I am now going to take some time to look through the examples of Islamophobia and highlight my areas of concern.

Examples of Islamophobia listed in the definition, include:

Accusing Muslim citizens of being more loyal to the ‘Ummah’ (transnational Muslim community) or to their countries of origin, or to the alleged priorities of Muslims worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

Sir John Jenkins, the former British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and co-author of the Government’s Muslim Brotherhood Review of 2015, reviewed the APPG’s definition of Islamophobia for Policy Exchange. In his report, he illustrates the meaning of Ummah with a quote from Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, a Turkish academic who was Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Professor Ihsanoglu suggests the Ummah

“… means the ‘community of the faithful’. It is a unique bond [sic] that has no similar example under any other political or religious system in the world… It is a belonging to ideals which bring Muslims together in an eternal brotherhood lock which transcends all other considerations of allegiance or loyalties or barriers or nationhood, ethnicity, geography or language.”

It is this understanding of the term (which does not translate directly into English ) — like so many of the nuances around wording and semantics — that can be overlooked by layperson politicians looking for a quick political win. Many of us will recognise this example’s sentiment — as it has clearly been lifted from the IHRA definition of antisemitism which states an example of antisemitism is,

‘accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.’

I understood this example within the IHRA as an exploration of a trope, which is unique in its centrality, to anti-Jewish prejudice. The baseless idea of the rootless Jew, more loyal to themselves, is a centuries-old prejudice.

However, I am keenly aware that it is common for ‘in-group’ loyalty to be invoked in prejudiced speech and I believe any definition of anti-Muslim prejudice should examine how the idea of duel or separates loyalties is invoked to other Muslims. However, my fear is that in its current wording, this Islamophobia definition leaves space to prevent critical examination of the concept of the Ummah and its bearing on the view of some Muslims towards higher loyalties above the nation-state. The problematic nature of this issue can be illustrated by considering the examples of British citizens who travelled to ISIS controlled Syria, and then destroyed their passports.

An illustrative example is to highlight that a common facet within Islamism is to presume ‘Muslims to be members of a de-territorialised, globalised ummah, where allegiance is defined through the fraternity of faith alone.’

Comparatively, Zionism — the Jewish national movement of self-determination — does not have the same theological underpinnings promoting the concept of shared identity or brotherhood. Therefore, it would be strange to link Zionism to a concept of shared fraternity along religious lines; and therefore linking Jews to loyalty to themselves or the State of Israel Zionism clearly springs from a very specific manifestation of antisemitic prejudice.

In short, I understand where this example is coming from. These definitions are useful and their needs to be thinking about how the trope of duel-loyalties (i.e one is more loyal ancestral home, to an Islamic state etc) manifests itself in the lived experience of Muslim Briton’s, without stepping into territory where it might prevent legitimate speech examining Islamic theory or concepts.

The reason I bring Zionism up is that the IHRA faced particularly rigorous scrutiny in this domain. Understandably so, because it is a political movement/ideology, and as such, it should be open to critique, criticism, or mockery, like any system of belief. Blurring the lines between innate ethnic or racial characteristics and belief systems is going to jar with our contemporary ideas of free speech. Any placement of criticism of a belief system (legitimate speech) into a definition of racism (illegitimate speech) is always going to be highly contentious.

The IHRA definition controversially explores examples of antisemitic speech through examples relating to the State of Israel and Zionism. It does this because, as Dave Rich from the Community Security Trust points out, ‘to reflects the fact that much antisemitic discourse today takes place in the context of debates over Israel and Palestine, or adopts the language of those debates as the medium through which to perpetuate older antisemitic themes.’

To do this day, I wonder whether I was right to support the IHRA definition. Deciding what is legitimate and what is legitimate speech in a liberal democracy is a profound decision. But for me, the definition is worded carefully and specifically enough to separate slander against a people, from a criticism of a belief (i.e Zionism) and I find its examples helpful and illustrative, while not delegitimising legitimate speech.

It is with this that I think I should illustrate my concerns over the Islamophobia definition by comparing it to the IHRA definition that it has modelled itself on.

Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour.

I think that it is legitimate to say that the State of Israel as we know of it today and how it was founded, is/was a racist endeavour (this is not to say I agree, I just think it is legitimate). However, to state that a State of Israel — as in any act of national self-determination for and by the Jewish people — is inherently racist, I think is illegitimate and bigoted.

Denying Muslim populations the right to self-determination e.g., by claiming that the existence of an independent Palestine or Kashmir is a terrorist endeavour.

Clearly, this section has been lifted from IHRA but as such, there has been less focus on the use of very specific wording in the context of anti-Muslim bigotry. I think it is within the realms of legitimate (again, not saying I agree) to argue against an independent Palestine or Kashmir, because, for example, of the violent (or terroristic) political currents that support those moves.

Moreover, a large number of Muslim populations are denied self-determination by other Muslim-majority states, including the Ahwazi Arabs and the Kurds — this suggests one can reject a Muslim populations rights to self-determination and not be motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice (or it may also suggest, that anti-Muslim prejudice can be sectarian and intra-communal, something the definition explicitly side-steps).

Instead, I would argue it is bigotry and illegitimate to reject the concept of Muslim national self-determination or any Muslim majority state, on the grounds of their religious identity (but not so on a political identity). Currently, there is no widespread political campaign against self-determination by Muslims, generally. By contrast, there is such a general campaign in relation to the self-determination of Jews.

It is these subtitles in language, and in understanding the difference between the socio-historical context of an ethnoreligious group as opposed to followers of a religion, that this definition overlooks. Trying to transpose the IHRA definition to another community, was always going to throw up issues. Take another example.

Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.

And,

Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Muslims as such, or of Muslims as a collective group, such as, especially but not exclusively, conspiracies about Muslim entryism in politics, government or other societal institutions; the myth of Muslim identity having a unique propensity for terrorism, and claims of a demographic ‘threat’ posed by Muslims or of a ‘Muslim takeover’

Now if the IHRA definition of antisemitism, put in allegation of ‘conspiracies about Jews entryism in politics’ as an example of racism, I would have rejected it. After all, it is well known that Jewish bodies or pro-Zionist organisations, lobby for their interests and support/endorse like-minded people in running for office. It is standard fare, but I know anyone pointing this out could be called out for loosely, propagating conspiracy, by those acting in bad faith. After all, lobbying can often be opaque, and conspiracy is a vague term. Fortunately, the IHRA definition is very specific and explicit — the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.

Unfortunately, our Islamophobia definition is much broader, using ‘conspiracies about Muslim entryism in politics’ as an example of racism. Many of my colleagues are not naive when it comes to understanding the way in which extremist political groups on the far-Left use entryism to further their aims. Similarly, entryism is a known tactic of Islamist organisations. Therefore, we must pause and ask ourselves — what impact would this have on journalistic and official enquiries into these areas? As Sir Jenkins highlights,

Would the Government have been able to appoint Peter Clarke as Education Commissioner for Birmingham with a remit to investigate “allegations concerning Birmingham schools arising from the ‘Trojan Horse’ letter” in 2014?

Would Ofsted have been able to carry out its inspections the same year, after the emergence of the scandal?

Moreover, ‘myth of Muslim identity having a unique propensity for terrorism’ — while it is true that this is a myth, I feel definition needs to offer more clarity to avoid muddying the water for academics, government agencies, or activists, who attempt to highlight the link between Islamism (‘perceived Muslimness’ again) and terrorist-Jihadism.

My arguments around semantics and clarity of language are not just philosophical ruminations. Our decisions have consequences.

The National Police Chief Council have been absolute in their rejection of this definition stating,

The definition of Islamophobia proposed by the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims is simply too broad to be effective and it risks creating confusion, representing what some might see as legitimate criticism of the tenets of Islam — a religion — as a racist hate crime, which cannot be right for a liberal democracy in which free speech is also a core value.

The words of warning are stark. The fact that this definition has been rejected by the Government, by the Commission for Countering Extremism and the NPCC, must give us profound food for thought. Moreover, the Metropolitan Police, in their response to the APPG for British Muslims, covers much of what I have written above.

All these organisations will think long and hard about whether this definition will impact their work and they will be motivated, primarily, in their duty to protect us and safeguard the tenants of free speech. The Government will also be under immense pressure to back this definition and win praise from several large Muslim organisations, but they have decided that they cannot endorse it.

It should also be noted that this definition has been rejected by the Federation of Student Islamic Societies, as they contest the idea that Islamophobia is racism or oppression primarily rooted in racism — reflecting the view of the wider muslim community as suggested in polling.

Moreover, the definition has also been deemed fundamentally flawed by the likes of the National Secular Society and Index on Censorship. I sincerely believe all the organisations I have mentioned above are acting in good faith. The same could not be said of the Labour Party, however, if there is any suspicion whatsoever that is seeking political advantage on such an important matter.

To conclude, I accept and understand that many of my colleagues might not be convinced by every one of my arguments. However, I believe that if you accept just one of my arguments, that should be enough for you to reject this definition. Because any definition of hate that we are offering institutionalised legitimacy, either as the Labour Party or as Lewisham Council, must be watertight in its language and its scope. This definition is not.

I would like to see this definition re-worked and focused on anti-Muslim speech — outlining in clear and specific terms and examples, discrimination based on faith — while providing scope for criticism of tenets of that faith. In short, a new definition that has the support of the bodies I have listed above, I would welcome with open arms.